Cybersecurity, software assurance & recovery

Packet identity

Packet ID

systems:cybersecurity

Packet SHA-256 identity

c143c856d4978f824701c6831dcc968482b4215f700f53579ca3d4d6155f9b0d

Corpus SHA-256 identity

8fa944604ca189f5a9216ca59f640ad2ca20972ad512f2f4970764716782e18d

Release ID

public-alpha-2026-07-26-research-visuals-r14

Source commit

3eb036fce3d711336c8c605625895e8a2e799ab0

Frozen corpus date

2026-07-25

Primary records

34

Reference sources

49

Questions and exclusions

Required questions

1. Required question 1 (exact ID: question-1)
   Does each evidence basis, readiness level, confidence level, rationale, and locator match the frozen sources?
2. Required question 2 (exact ID: question-2)
   Are dependencies, failure modes, precursors, unknowns, Earthside benefits, and the stop gate technically and ethically bounded?
3. Required question 3 (exact ID: question-3)
   Which conclusion should be approved, revised, contested, rejected, or recused from at its current fingerprint?

Explicit exclusions

• A system packet is not a complete spacecraft design, feasibility proof, safety case, or launch authorization.
• Context sources do not become direct support unless the record says so with an exact locator and relation.

Requested controlled scopes: defensive-cyber-safety, information-science, security-assurance, systems-engineering

Frozen-evidence decision window: 365 days from the packet freeze. Not applicable to this packet family.

Complete primary record set

Every record below has one primary packet owner. Decisions must bind to the exact record and packet fingerprints; a changed lesson body, evidence grade, citation, locator, source snapshot, requirement, policy, release, or commit expires the old packet.

1. system · cybersecurity

   Cybersecurity, software assurance & recovery

   Record fingerprint

   48a0199de1d45db9fdb9aad2b20fcd4d219be2d336a58c2b4b44921d27a82a21

   Minimum approvals

   1

   Required scope groups

   bounded-competence: defensive-cyber-safety, security-assurance

   High-consequence domains

   None under the named two-person rule

   Review state

   pending

   Published human decisions

   0

   Inspect the complete frozen review surface

   Slug

   cybersecurity

   Name

   Cybersecurity, software assurance & recovery

   Short Name

   Cyber resilience

   Index

   12

   Thesis

   Generation-ship security protects a civilization’s ability to operate, repair, govern, learn, and recover without an external rescuer—not merely its secrets.

   Current State

   1. Space, operational-technology, software-supply-chain, zero-trust, post-quantum, and cyber-resilience standards provide relevant but fragmented reference points; their existence does not establish integration or assurance.
   2. Secure-update patterns, attestation, delay-tolerant networking, formally assessed kernels, software bills of materials, and reproducible-build practices exist in different contexts. Availability does not establish compatibility, flight qualification, century maintenance, or safe integration.
   3. Within the public sources sampled for this foundation draft, we did not identify a generation-ship cybersecurity standard or a demonstrated century-scale cryptographic deployment.

   Unknowns

   1. Trust anchors, identity, secure time, revocation, incident command, threshold recovery, crypto-agile migration, anti-rollback, and archival signature interpretation must work locally after permanent loss of Earth.
   2. Insiders, collusion, governance capture, compromised suppliers, corrupted hardware, malicious maintenance, radiation faults, operator error, and generational loss of expertise must be addressed without turning safety monitoring into surveillance or political control.
   3. Onboard manufacturing makes malicious designs, poisoned toolchains, compromised metrology, counterfeit replacement parts, and configuration drift cyber-physical threats.

   Earth Benefits

   1. Disconnected trust fabrics, update airlocks, recovery vaults, and cyber ranges benefit critical infrastructure and remote industry.
   2. Crypto agility and toolchain escrow reduce obsolescence risk in medical, energy, transport, and public systems.

   Dependencies

   1. ai-autonomy
   2. communications-navigation
   3. manufacturing-isru

   Gate

   Mixed crews must repeatedly isolate a compromised zone, maintain life support, investigate locally, rebuild from known-good material, and rejoin safely.

   Sources

   1. Title

      NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0

      URL

      https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

      Kind

      Primary or institutional source

   2. Title

      NIST Cyber-Resilient Systems Engineering

      URL

      https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/160/v2/r1/final↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

      Kind

      Primary or institutional source

   3. Title

      NIST Operational Technology Security

      URL

      https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

      Kind

      Primary or institutional source

   4. Title

      NIST Secure Software Development Framework

      URL

      https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

      Kind

      Primary or institutional source

   Failure Modes

   1. A compromised build, spare, model, credential, or maintenance interface crosses isolation boundaries.
   2. Cryptography, identity, or recovery procedures become obsolete while privileged operators lose the ability to re-establish trust.

   Precursors

   1. Secure-by-design operational technology, reproducible builds, signed evidence graphs, and offline recovery media.
   2. Long-horizon incident exercises that include insider risk, degraded communications, hardware loss, and cryptographic migration.

2. claim · claim-12-01

   Generation-ship security protects a civilization’s ability to operate, repair, govern, learn, and recover without an external rescuer—not merely its secrets.

   Record fingerprint

   908842da73f03771a9e09cc29bdc8e3863610f7ab9de665f452f153f7bb618b1

   Minimum approvals

   2

   Required scope groups

   domain-method: defensive-cyber-safety, governance-law-rights, security-assurance; rights-public-interest: affected-public-rights

   High-consequence domains

   cybersecurity, governance, life-support-continuity

   Review state

   pending

   Published human decisions

   0

   Inspect the complete frozen review surface

   ID

   claim-12-01

   System Slug

   cybersecurity

   Kind

   thesis

   Statement Ref

   Field

   thesis

   Statement

   Generation-ship security protects a civilization’s ability to operate, repair, govern, learn, and recover without an external rescuer—not merely its secrets.

   Statement Fingerprint

   c805232b478356847ba74782b6221b09ce6a1bc05c761188d34e892a9ddb771c

   Assessment

   Status

   Editorial assessed (exact value: editorial-assessed)

   Basis

   normative

   Readiness

   Early research (exact value: early-research)

   Confidence

   strong

   Rationale

   Current cyber-resiliency and incident-response guidance explicitly centers mission or organizational outcomes, anticipation, continued operation, recovery, and adaptation. NASA's Space Security Best Practices Guide strengthens the present space-mission context but does not support the claim's civilization-scale governance, learning, repair, or permanent-isolation extension. Extending the framing remains a normative systems proposal, not a demonstrated generation-ship implementation.

   Citations

   1. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-cyber-resilience-800160v2r1

      Locator

      Executive summary and sections 2.1 through 2.3 defining cyber resiliency as the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse conditions involving cyber resources.

      Relation

      Direct method (exact value: direct-method)

   2. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-incident-80061r3

      Locator

      CSF 2.0 Community Profile across Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover, including preparation and improvement outside the immediate response phase.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   3. Source ID

      src-im-nist-ot-80082r3

      Locator

      Sections 2, 3, 5, and 6 on OT mission, safety, reliability, availability, physical effects, incident response, and recovery constraints.

      Relation

      Scope boundary (exact value: scope-boundary)

   4. Source ID

      src-cr-nasa-space-security-bpg-revb

      Locator

      Sections 1.1–1.2 on risk-based mission-success framing, space-vehicle and ground-segment scope, initial-baseline status, and the statement that the guide does not replace the System Security Plan.

      Relation

      Scope boundary (exact value: scope-boundary)

   Context Source IDs

   1. core-12-1
   2. core-12-2
   3. core-12-3
   4. core-12-4

   Editorial Provenance

   Status

   Substantive editorial review (exact value: substantive-editorial-review)

   Reviewers

   1. GShips Project editorial synthesis

   Conflicts

   1. Publisher intends to explore a commercial venture based on some GShips work; no entity, funding, customer, sponsor, or partner relationship with cited organizations is reported.

   What Would Change

   A reviewed alternative security objective that better preserves essential service, repair, learning, legitimate governance, and local recovery could replace this framing. Repeated closed-habitat tests showing that confidentiality-centered controls alone preserve those outcomes would weaken it; repeated failures of mission-centered designs would require narrowing or redesign.

   High Consequence

   1. cybersecurity
   2. life-support-continuity
   3. governance

3. claim · claim-12-02

   Space-sector guidance and protocol-security reports, operational-technology, software-supply-chain, zero-trust, post-quantum, and cyber-resilience standards provide relevant but fragmented reference points; their existence does not establish integration or assurance.

   Record fingerprint

   0f49699074aad1bdc4026a7e08cecd517f96beb614fa4055762c508de9fa31fc

   Minimum approvals

   2

   Required scope groups

   domain-method: defensive-cyber-safety, dual-use-risk, security-assurance; rights-public-interest: affected-public-rights

   High-consequence domains

   cybersecurity, dual-use, spacecraft-safety

   Review state

   pending

   Published human decisions

   0

   Inspect the complete frozen review surface

   ID

   claim-12-02

   System Slug

   cybersecurity

   Kind

   current state

   Statement Ref

   Field

   currentState

   Index

   0

   Statement

   Space-sector guidance and protocol-security reports, operational-technology, software-supply-chain, zero-trust, post-quantum, and cyber-resilience standards provide relevant but fragmented reference points; their existence does not establish integration or assurance.

   Statement Fingerprint

   dee7d9059c1d19cbe5f79d789f2e9c600c7a847341eebf8b9c2ad004a902cde2

   Assessment

   Status

   Editorial assessed (exact value: editorial-assessed)

   Basis

   observed

   Readiness

   Major scale up (exact value: major-scale-up)

   Confidence

   strong

   Rationale

   Authoritative publications separately address OT security, zero trust, cyber-resilient systems, secure development, supply chains, and post-quantum cryptography. NASA's BPG is guidance, CCSDS 350.0-G-3 is an informational report, and the CryptoLib record is an abstract-only implementation report. Their different authorities, scopes, assumptions, and system boundaries support the claim that reference points exist but do not by themselves establish compatibility, integration, conformance, or assurance for a closed habitat.

   Citations

   1. Source ID

      src-im-nist-ot-80082r3

      Locator

      Sections 2 and 3 on operational-technology architectures, safety and availability constraints, threats, and risk differences from ordinary information systems.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   2. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-zero-trust-800207

      Locator

      Sections 2 and 3 on zero-trust tenets and logical components, and section 7 on threats; enterprise scope is explicit.

      Relation

      Scope boundary (exact value: scope-boundary)

   3. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-ssdf-800218

      Locator

      Table 1 practices PO, PS, PW, and RV for secure software development and vulnerability response.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   4. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-fips203-mlkem

      Locator

      Sections 1 through 7 defining ML-KEM purpose, parameter sets, algorithms, and implementation requirements.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   5. Source ID

      src-cr-nasa-std-1006a

      Locator

      Active NASA mission-protection requirements; applicability does not establish implementation or assurance for any particular architecture.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   6. Source ID

      src-cr-nasa-space-security-bpg-revb

      Locator

      Sections 1.1–1.2 and the principles/control mappings: NASA describes mission-security guidance and an initial starting point, not a validated integrated architecture.

      Relation

      Direct observation (exact value: direct-observation)

   7. Source ID

      src-cr-ccsds-350-0-g-3

      Locator

      Foreword, document status, and Section 1 purpose and scope: protocol-layer security options classified as a Green Book informational report, not a Recommended Standard.

      Relation

      Scope boundary (exact value: scope-boundary)

   8. Source ID

      src-cr-nasa-cryptolib-2023

      Locator

      NTRS abstract paragraphs 2–4: the project aims at CCSDS SDLS compliance and reports selected TC, TM, and AOS cryptography functions; the source is abstract-only and reports development status rather than conformance.

      Relation

      Direct observation (exact value: direct-observation)

   Context Source IDs

   1. core-12-1
   2. core-12-2
   3. core-12-3
   4. core-12-4

   Editorial Provenance

   Status

   Substantive editorial review (exact value: substantive-editorial-review)

   Reviewers

   1. GShips Project editorial synthesis

   Conflicts

   1. Publisher intends to explore a commercial venture based on some GShips work; no entity, funding, customer, sponsor, or partner relationship with cited organizations is reported.

   What Would Change

   A published, independently reviewed architecture that maps these standards into one representative closed-habitat assurance case, resolves conflicting assumptions, and passes integrated safety and recovery tests would change the fragmentation conclusion. Merely citing more standards would not.

   High Consequence

   1. cybersecurity
   2. spacecraft-safety
   3. dual-use

4. claim · claim-12-03

   Secure firmware-update patterns, platform recovery, software-component inventories, bundle-layer security for disrupted networking, and a publicly described CCSDS-oriented space-data-link cryptography library exist in different contexts. Availability does not establish compatibility, conformance, flight qualification, safe integration, or century maintenance.

   Record fingerprint

   6055efdd9314736b322ecafce96268e59c3ddc2c7874b92f43b11b7494689e92

   Minimum approvals

   2

   Required scope groups

   domain-method: defensive-cyber-safety, dual-use-risk, security-assurance; rights-public-interest: affected-public-rights

   High-consequence domains

   cybersecurity, dual-use, software-supply-chain, spacecraft-safety

   Review state

   pending

   Published human decisions

   0

   Inspect the complete frozen review surface

   ID

   claim-12-03

   System Slug

   cybersecurity

   Kind

   current state

   Statement Ref

   Field

   currentState

   Index

   1

   Statement

   Secure firmware-update patterns, platform recovery, software-component inventories, bundle-layer security for disrupted networking, and a publicly described CCSDS-oriented space-data-link cryptography library exist in different contexts. Availability does not establish compatibility, conformance, flight qualification, safe integration, or century maintenance.

   Statement Fingerprint

   f34f71c04e7de1ae413c8ffe6b8bdb1238a23f2ea53cf1e06528b94325e93c4d

   Assessment

   Status

   Editorial assessed (exact value: editorial-assessed)

   Basis

   observed

   Readiness

   Early research (exact value: early-research)

   Confidence

   supported

   Rationale

   The cited sources establish secure-firmware-update architecture, platform protect-detect-recover mechanisms, software-component transparency, and bundle-layer security. The NTRS abstract publicly describes an actively developed CCSDS-oriented cryptography library but does not establish conformance, secure implementation, deployment, or flight qualification. The sources do not establish compatibility among components, safe key governance, integration, or century maintenance.

   Citations

   1. Source ID

      src-cr-ietf-rfc9019-suit

      Locator

      Sections 3 through 7 and 10 on update roles, authenticated manifests, target matching, sequence controls, dependencies, interruption, installation, and recovery.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   2. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-firmware-800193

      Locator

      Sections 3 and 4 on roots of trust and mechanisms to protect, detect unauthorized change, and securely recover platform firmware and critical data.

      Relation

      Scope boundary (exact value: scope-boundary)

   3. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-ssdf-800218

      Locator

      Practices PS.1 through PS.3 and PW.4 through PW.9 on protecting code, verifying third-party components, review, testing, secure defaults, and release integrity.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   4. Source ID

      src-cr-cisa-sbom

      Locator

      SBOM definition, ecosystem roles, use cases, and current minimum-elements materials.

      Relation

      Direct observation (exact value: direct-observation)

   5. Source ID

      src-pn-ietf-bpsec

      Locator

      Sections defining integrity and confidentiality security blocks for Bundle Protocol in disrupted and delay-tolerant networks.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   6. Source ID

      src-cr-ccsds-350-0-g-3

      Locator

      Section 1 and protocol-layer application discussion; the Green Book is an informational scope boundary, not proof that CryptoLib conforms.

      Relation

      Scope boundary (exact value: scope-boundary)

   7. Source ID

      src-cr-nasa-cryptolib-2023

      Locator

      Abstract paragraphs 2–4: active-development and aims-to-comply language plus selected TC, TM, and AOS scope; abstract-only record.

      Relation

      Direct observation (exact value: direct-observation)

   Context Source IDs

   1. core-12-1
   2. core-12-2
   3. core-12-3
   4. core-12-4

   Editorial Provenance

   Status

   Substantive editorial review (exact value: substantive-editorial-review)

   Reviewers

   1. GShips Project editorial synthesis

   Conflicts

   1. Publisher intends to explore a commercial venture based on some GShips work; no entity, funding, customer, sponsor, or partner relationship with cited organizations is reported.

   What Would Change

   A representative integrated test combining secure update, platform recovery, disrupted networking, transparent software composition, space-data-link cryptography, old hardware, power interruption, key loss or compromise, and verified rollback would raise readiness. A public conformance result and operational deployment would strengthen the CryptoLib example. Evidence of incompatibility, unsafe recovery, unmaintainable cryptography, or correlated trust failure would narrow candidate architectures.

   High Consequence

   1. cybersecurity
   2. software-supply-chain
   3. spacecraft-safety
   4. dual-use

5. claim · claim-12-04

   Within the public sources sampled for this foundation draft, we did not identify a generation-ship cybersecurity standard or a demonstrated century-scale cryptographic deployment.

   Record fingerprint

   1f2f998d50f9608459ee4d3da4ac355a5bf83f8c7d328e5d931ade7d5e4ec478

   Minimum approvals

   2

   Required scope groups

   domain-method: defensive-cyber-safety, security-assurance; rights-public-interest: affected-public-rights

   High-consequence domains

   cryptography, cybersecurity, spacecraft-safety

   Review state

   pending

   Published human decisions

   0

   Inspect the complete frozen review surface

   ID

   claim-12-04

   System Slug

   cybersecurity

   Kind

   current state

   Statement Ref

   Field

   currentState

   Index

   2

   Statement

   Within the public sources sampled for this foundation draft, we did not identify a generation-ship cybersecurity standard or a demonstrated century-scale cryptographic deployment.

   Statement Fingerprint

   3f1223a76b93a7df07fdda1de97e20db6cb6a61d43dbc77e993cd336bd4414fd

   Assessment

   Status

   Editorial assessed (exact value: editorial-assessed)

   Basis

   observed

   Readiness

   No known path (exact value: no-known-path)

   Confidence

   supported

   Rationale

   The bounded official corpus contains current standards and guidance for cyber resilience, key management, algorithm transition, and post-quantum primitives, each scoped to present systems and transitions. It contains neither a generation-ship cybersecurity standard nor a demonstrated century-scale cryptographic deployment. This is a transparent bounded-corpus finding, not proof that no relevant document exists anywhere.

   Citations

   1. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-cyber-resilience-800160v2r1

      Locator

      Scope, executive summary, and chapters 2 and 3; general systems-security engineering context without a generation-ship profile.

      Relation

      Direct observation (exact value: direct-observation)

   2. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-key-management-80057p1r5

      Locator

      Sections 5 through 8 on algorithms, key lifecycle, protection periods, compromise, backup, recovery, archival, and destruction.

      Relation

      Context only (exact value: context-only)

   3. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-crypto-agility-cswp39u1

      Locator

      Definition, discovery and inventory, strategic planning, protocol and application transitions, operational mechanisms, trade-offs, and areas for further work.

      Relation

      Context only (exact value: context-only)

   4. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-fips204-mldsa

      Locator

      Sections 1 through 7 defining ML-DSA, approved parameter sets, and implementation requirements; no century-deployment claim.

      Relation

      Scope boundary (exact value: scope-boundary)

   Context Source IDs

   1. core-12-1
   2. core-12-2
   3. core-12-3
   4. core-12-4

   Editorial Provenance

   Status

   Substantive editorial review (exact value: substantive-editorial-review)

   Reviewers

   1. GShips Project editorial synthesis

   Conflicts

   1. Publisher intends to explore a commercial venture based on some GShips work; no entity, funding, customer, sponsor, or partner relationship with cited organizations is reported.

   What Would Change

   Discovery of an authoritative generation-ship cybersecurity standard would falsify the first bounded finding. Independently audited cryptographic operation over a century, including algorithm migration, key succession, archival validation, old hardware, and compromise recovery, would change the second; a paper lifetime estimate would not.

   High Consequence

   1. cybersecurity
   2. cryptography
   3. spacecraft-safety

6. claim · claim-12-05

   Trust anchors, identity, secure time, revocation, incident command, threshold recovery, crypto-agile migration, anti-rollback, and archival signature interpretation must work locally after permanent loss of Earth.

   Record fingerprint

   2811cbe867ae12c3b3d54f9da45439d26535ec4349f41ae4a7cb36eb37ea26a1

   Minimum approvals

   2

   Required scope groups

   domain-method: defensive-cyber-safety, governance-law-rights, security-assurance; rights-public-interest: affected-public-rights

   High-consequence domains

   cybersecurity, governance

   Review state

   pending

   Published human decisions

   0

   Inspect the complete frozen review surface

   ID

   claim-12-05

   System Slug

   cybersecurity

   Kind

   unknown

   Statement Ref

   Field

   unknowns

   Index

   0

   Statement

   Trust anchors, identity, secure time, revocation, incident command, threshold recovery, crypto-agile migration, anti-rollback, and archival signature interpretation must work locally after permanent loss of Earth.

   Statement Fingerprint

   9889918cc748c4b0b6cfa5f73d5debe30ebb19f2d08bbaf210e1d531d9552e19

   Assessment

   Status

   Editorial assessed (exact value: editorial-assessed)

   Basis

   normative

   Readiness

   Early research (exact value: early-research)

   Confidence

   supported

   Rationale

   Bundle security, archival standards, atomic clocks, and current operational security practices address parts of the requirement. No reviewed evidence demonstrates crypto-agile identity, secure-time, revocation, threshold recovery, anti-rollback, incident command, and archival interpretation as one locally recoverable multigenerational institution.

   Citations

   1. Source ID

      src-pn-ietf-bpsec

      Locator

      Security-block processing, integrity and confidentiality services, threat model, and key-management exclusions.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   2. Source ID

      src-pn-ccsds-oais

      Locator

      Representation information, preservation planning, archive management, access, and designated-community requirements.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   3. Source ID

      src-pn-jpl-dsac

      Locator

      Space atomic-clock stability result, mission duration, and bounded technology-demonstration scope.

      Relation

      Direct demonstration (exact value: direct-demonstration)

   Context Source IDs

   1. core-12-1
   2. core-12-2
   3. core-12-3
   4. core-12-4

   Editorial Provenance

   Status

   Substantive editorial review (exact value: substantive-editorial-review)

   Reviewers

   1. GShips Project editorial synthesis

   Conflicts

   1. Publisher intends to explore a commercial venture based on some GShips work.

   What Would Change

   A long-duration red-team and succession program that repeatedly recovers clocks, identities, keys, revocation state, archives, commands, and cryptographic migrations without Earth, original experts, or one trusted implementation would raise readiness.

   High Consequence

   1. cybersecurity
   2. governance

7. claim · claim-12-06

   Insiders, collusion, governance capture, compromised suppliers, corrupted hardware, malicious maintenance, radiation faults, operator error, and generational loss of expertise must be addressed without turning safety monitoring into surveillance or political control.

   Record fingerprint

   e661cc2789a8cd078b10a5fa6f5f4bb267c1dcdcc4156a6fd1870fa857a41db2

   Minimum approvals

   2

   Required scope groups

   domain-method: defensive-cyber-safety, governance-law-rights, security-assurance; rights-public-interest: affected-public-rights

   High-consequence domains

   cybersecurity, governance, human-rights, life-support-continuity, privacy

   Review state

   pending

   Published human decisions

   0

   Inspect the complete frozen review surface

   ID

   claim-12-06

   System Slug

   cybersecurity

   Kind

   unknown

   Statement Ref

   Field

   unknowns

   Index

   1

   Statement

   Insiders, collusion, governance capture, compromised suppliers, corrupted hardware, malicious maintenance, radiation faults, operator error, and generational loss of expertise must be addressed without turning safety monitoring into surveillance or political control.

   Statement Fingerprint

   214d781b1e11d13c5cdd7ff5867c7ed4cdbec323c647bf0dd76fcdab69f548b6

   Assessment

   Status

   Editorial assessed (exact value: editorial-assessed)

   Basis

   normative

   Readiness

   Early research (exact value: early-research)

   Confidence

   supported

   Rationale

   Current OT, supply-chain, security-control, and adversarial-AI guidance supports the inclusion of insiders, suppliers, hardware and software corruption, maintenance access, operator error, and poisoned models. Governance capture, generational expertise loss, and limits on surveillance are essential normative extensions for a closed society; the cited technical sources do not resolve their constitutional implementation.

   Citations

   1. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-scrm-800161r1u1

      Locator

      Executive summary and sections 2 and 3 on malicious functionality, counterfeit, tampering, poor development and manufacturing practice, supplier visibility, and multilevel lifecycle risk.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   2. Source ID

      src-im-nist-ot-80082r3

      Locator

      Threat and vulnerability sections covering insiders, maintenance, remote access, supply chain, configuration, operator error, availability, safety, and physical consequences.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   3. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-controls-80053r5

      Locator

      Personnel Security, Access Control, Audit and Accountability, Privacy, Supply Chain Risk Management, Maintenance, Incident Response, and System Integrity control families.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   4. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-aml-100-2e2025

      Locator

      Taxonomy chapters covering predictive- and generative-AI poisoning, evasion, privacy, misuse, lifecycle stages, attacker capabilities, and mitigation limitations.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   Context Source IDs

   1. core-12-1
   2. core-12-2
   3. core-12-3
   4. core-12-4

   Editorial Provenance

   Status

   Substantive editorial review (exact value: substantive-editorial-review)

   Reviewers

   1. GShips Project editorial synthesis

   Conflicts

   1. Publisher intends to explore a commercial venture based on some GShips work; no entity, funding, customer, sponsor, or partner relationship with cited organizations is reported.

   What Would Change

   Long-duration habitat trials with independent civil-rights review could identify a narrower threat set or controls that provide equivalent safety with less monitoring. Evidence that proposed telemetry, identity, or emergency powers predictably enable coercion or suppress truthful reporting should remove or redesign those controls, even if they improve technical detection.

   High Consequence

   1. cybersecurity
   2. governance
   3. privacy
   4. human-rights
   5. life-support-continuity

8. claim · claim-12-07

   Onboard manufacturing makes malicious designs, poisoned toolchains, compromised metrology, counterfeit replacement parts, and configuration drift cyber-physical threats.

   Record fingerprint

   aa41b5d69f1e2cb946f156453cc5e43165f992ffba714ec0b1562413e4751e5c

   Minimum approvals

   2

   Required scope groups

   domain-method: defensive-cyber-safety, security-assurance; rights-public-interest: affected-public-rights

   High-consequence domains

   cybersecurity, spacecraft-safety, supply-chain

   Review state

   pending

   Published human decisions

   0

   Inspect the complete frozen review surface

   ID

   claim-12-07

   System Slug

   cybersecurity

   Kind

   unknown

   Statement Ref

   Field

   unknowns

   Index

   2

   Statement

   Onboard manufacturing makes malicious designs, poisoned toolchains, compromised metrology, counterfeit replacement parts, and configuration drift cyber-physical threats.

   Statement Fingerprint

   652aecb33bcd4c10a3c944775abc632ed556d9e8ee441a6b895d6cdfe4481ec3

   Assessment

   Status

   Editorial assessed (exact value: editorial-assessed)

   Basis

   modeled

   Readiness

   Early research (exact value: early-research)

   Confidence

   supported

   Rationale

   Manufacturing records, controller software, toolpaths, process limits, metrology corrections, and acceptance criteria directly govern physical outputs. Current OT security and NASA manufacturing assurance controls support the threat pathways, while a generation-scale adversarial factory test has not been performed.

   Citations

   1. Source ID

      src-im-nist-ot-80082r3

      Locator

      Sections on manufacturing OT, supply-chain compromise, unauthorized change, maintenance access, segmentation, integrity, and recovery.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   2. Source ID

      src-im-nasa-std-6030

      Locator

      Requirements covering authorized process specifications, feedstock, machine qualification, digital build files, configuration control, inspection, and acceptance.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   3. Source ID

      src-im-nasa-metrology-873912

      Locator

      Requirements for selection, calibration, control, traceability, and use of measuring and test equipment affecting safety or mission success.

      Relation

      Direct method (exact value: direct-method)

   4. Source ID

      src-im-nasa-eee-873910

      Locator

      Scope and requirements for electronic-part acquisition, traceability, testing, handling, storage, application, and supply risk.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   Context Source IDs

   1. core-12-1
   2. core-12-2
   3. core-12-3
   4. core-12-4

   Editorial Provenance

   Status

   Substantive editorial review (exact value: substantive-editorial-review)

   Reviewers

   1. GShips Project editorial synthesis

   Conflicts

   1. Publisher intends to explore a commercial venture based on some GShips work.

   What Would Change

   A representative cyber-physical factory exercise that controls unauthorized designs and process changes, detects poisoned tools and calibration, rejects counterfeit parts, restores a known-good configuration, and measures residual defects would change confidence and required controls.

   High Consequence

   1. cybersecurity
   2. supply-chain
   3. spacecraft-safety

9. claim · claim-12-08

   Disconnected trust fabrics, update airlocks, recovery vaults, and cyber ranges benefit critical infrastructure and remote industry.

   Record fingerprint

   cf9e9af24876befe4386e5d20c5bd3940c82a2f55d410ae762b76cc43357ca22

   Minimum approvals

   2

   Required scope groups

   domain-method: defensive-cyber-safety, dual-use-risk, security-assurance; rights-public-interest: affected-public-rights

   High-consequence domains

   critical-infrastructure, cybersecurity, dual-use

   Review state

   pending

   Published human decisions

   0

   Inspect the complete frozen review surface

   ID

   claim-12-08

   System Slug

   cybersecurity

   Kind

   earth benefit

   Statement Ref

   Field

   earthBenefits

   Index

   0

   Statement

   Disconnected trust fabrics, update airlocks, recovery vaults, and cyber ranges benefit critical infrastructure and remote industry.

   Statement Fingerprint

   3091af12d5127935922a8d65792b3d50cbee8d89257ecb9341ecfe8844f77279

   Assessment

   Status

   Editorial assessed (exact value: editorial-assessed)

   Basis

   proposed

   Readiness

   Early research (exact value: early-research)

   Confidence

   tentative

   Rationale

   Disconnected recovery, segmented operation, controlled updates, firmware recovery, and incident exercises are relevant to current critical infrastructure and remote operations. The specific bundle described by the claim has not been evaluated as one intervention, so Earthside benefit is plausible but not established net of cost, complexity, workload, accessibility, and governance risk.

   Citations

   1. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-cyber-resilience-800160v2r1

      Locator

      Cyber-resiliency techniques and approaches including segmentation, diversity, redundancy, substantiated integrity, predefined segmentation, and recovery.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   2. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-firmware-800193

      Locator

      Protect, detect, and recover model for platform firmware and critical data, including roots of trust.

      Relation

      Context only (exact value: context-only)

   3. Source ID

      src-cr-nist-incident-80061r3

      Locator

      CSF 2.0 profile recommendations for preparation, detection, response, recovery, communications, and improvement.

      Relation

      Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

   4. Source ID

      src-im-nist-ot-80082r3

      Locator

      OT architectures, segmentation, incident response, recovery, safety, and availability constraints relevant to remote and critical industry.

      Relation

      Context only (exact value: context-only)

   Context Source IDs

   1. core-12-1
   2. core-12-2
   3. core-12-3
   4. core-12-4

   Editorial Provenance

   Status

   Substantive editorial review (exact value: substantive-editorial-review)

   Reviewers

   1. GShips Project editorial synthesis

   Conflicts

   1. Publisher intends to explore a commercial venture based on some GShips work; no entity, funding, customer, sponsor, or partner relationship with cited organizations is reported.

   What Would Change

   Controlled deployments in remote utilities, hospitals, industrial sites, or isolated research stations should measure safe-service continuity, recovery time, false isolation, operator burden, accessibility, privacy impact, and total cost against a baseline. Consistent harm or no benefit would weaken or reverse the Earth-benefit claim.

   High Consequence

   1. cybersecurity
   2. critical-infrastructure
   3. dual-use

10. claim · claim-12-09

    Crypto agility and toolchain escrow reduce obsolescence risk in medical, energy, transport, and public systems.

    Record fingerprint

    4c3588aab47e1175acc7a32a66fd16e23f01df3fd603f3d4005e2e5503935290

    Minimum approvals

    2

    Required scope groups

    domain-method: defensive-cyber-safety, security-assurance; rights-public-interest: affected-public-rights

    High-consequence domains

    critical-infrastructure, cybersecurity, software-supply-chain

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    claim-12-09

    System Slug

    cybersecurity

    Kind

    earth benefit

    Statement Ref

    Field

    earthBenefits

    Index

    1

    Statement

    Crypto agility and toolchain escrow reduce obsolescence risk in medical, energy, transport, and public systems.

    Statement Fingerprint

    d727ace64c3dbae511612cfdaa6d61d9dd6a06428fee0a02ce3b3c311bcd8d36

    Assessment

    Status

    Editorial assessed (exact value: editorial-assessed)

    Basis

    proposed

    Readiness

    Major scale up (exact value: major-scale-up)

    Confidence

    supported

    Rationale

    NIST guidance directly treats algorithm replacement, cryptographic inventories, key lifecycle, secure development, supply-chain visibility, and transition continuity as current risk-management needs. Preserving build tools, source, specifications, and recovery knowledge as an escrowed local capability is a systems inference rather than a directly demonstrated cross-sector program.

    Citations

    1. Source ID

       src-cr-nist-crypto-agility-cswp39u1

       Locator

       Sections on cryptographic discovery and inventory, strategic planning, protocols, applications, operational mechanisms, transition dependencies, trade-offs, and metrics.

       Relation

       Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

    2. Source ID

       src-cr-nist-key-management-80057p1r5

       Locator

       Key-management lifecycle, cryptoperiods, compromise, backup, recovery, archival, and transition-related protection requirements.

       Relation

       Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

    3. Source ID

       src-cr-nist-ssdf-800218

       Locator

       Practices PO.1 through PO.5, PS.1 through PS.3, PW.4 through PW.9, and RV.1 through RV.3 for organizational preparation, protected artifacts, secure production, and vulnerability response.

       Relation

       Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

    4. Source ID

       src-cr-nist-scrm-800161r1u1

       Locator

       Lifecycle and supplier-risk guidance addressing provenance, reduced visibility, dependencies, maintenance, and product or service continuity.

       Relation

       Context only (exact value: context-only)

    Context Source IDs

    1. core-12-1
    2. core-12-2
    3. core-12-3
    4. core-12-4

    Editorial Provenance

    Status

    Substantive editorial review (exact value: substantive-editorial-review)

    Reviewers

    1. GShips Project editorial synthesis

    Conflicts

    1. Publisher intends to explore a commercial venture based on some GShips work; no entity, funding, customer, sponsor, or partner relationship with cited organizations is reported.

    What Would Change

    Longitudinal evidence from medical, energy, transport, or public systems should compare migration time, outage, stranded assets, security regressions, and recovery with and without maintained inventories and locally recoverable toolchains. Evidence that escrow increases compromise or obsolescence risk more than it reduces transition risk would narrow the claim.

    High Consequence

    1. cybersecurity
    2. critical-infrastructure
    3. software-supply-chain

11. claim · claim-12-10

    Mixed crews must repeatedly isolate a compromised zone, maintain life support, investigate locally, rebuild from known-good material, and rejoin safely.

    Record fingerprint

    718e87306ab83c20b2c477e928406ce5697e01b1a5b64ab9cde6d6fbcbe148be

    Minimum approvals

    2

    Required scope groups

    domain-method: defensive-cyber-safety, dual-use-risk, governance-law-rights, security-assurance; rights-public-interest: affected-public-rights

    High-consequence domains

    cybersecurity, dual-use, governance, life-support-continuity, spacecraft-safety

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    claim-12-10

    System Slug

    cybersecurity

    Kind

    decision gate

    Statement Ref

    Field

    gate

    Statement

    Mixed crews must repeatedly isolate a compromised zone, maintain life support, investigate locally, rebuild from known-good material, and rejoin safely.

    Statement Fingerprint

    4f05154a910bd1893b5d593a3436968f8a69ec03158413dd31735a0f241feddc

    Assessment

    Status

    Editorial assessed (exact value: editorial-assessed)

    Basis

    normative

    Readiness

    Early research (exact value: early-research)

    Confidence

    supported

    Rationale

    Current incident-response, OT, cyber-resiliency, and recovery guidance supports preparation, isolation, minimum-safe operation, known-good restoration, testing, and measured recovery. Requiring repeated mixed-crew exercises without Earth is a GShips safety gate; no cited source demonstrates that integrated capability in a generation-scale habitat.

    Citations

    1. Source ID

       src-cr-nist-incident-80061r3

       Locator

       Respond and Recover profile outcomes and supporting Govern, Identify, Protect, and Detect recommendations for preparation, analysis, mitigation, communication, and improvement.

       Relation

       Direct normative authority (exact value: direct-normative-authority)

    2. Source ID

       src-cr-nist-recovery-800184

       Locator

       Sections 2 through 4 on recovery planning, playbooks, testing, metrics, restoration, and lessons learned.

       Relation

       Direct method (exact value: direct-method)

    3. Source ID

       src-cr-nist-cyber-resilience-800160v2r1

       Locator

       Cyber-resiliency goals and techniques for withstanding, recovering, adapting, segmentation, diversity, redundancy, and substantiated integrity.

       Relation

       Direct method (exact value: direct-method)

    4. Source ID

       src-im-nist-ot-80082r3

       Locator

       Sections on OT safety and availability constraints, incident response, contingency planning, recovery, architectures, and segmentation.

       Relation

       Scope boundary (exact value: scope-boundary)

    Context Source IDs

    1. core-12-1
    2. core-12-2
    3. core-12-3
    4. core-12-4

    Editorial Provenance

    Status

    Substantive editorial review (exact value: substantive-editorial-review)

    Reviewers

    1. GShips Project editorial synthesis

    Conflicts

    1. Publisher intends to explore a commercial venture based on some GShips work; no entity, funding, customer, sponsor, or partner relationship with cited organizations is reported.

    What Would Change

    An independently reviewed assurance protocol demonstrating equal or stronger coverage could replace this gate. To satisfy it, changing mixed crews must repeatedly maintain declared minimum safe service while isolated, preserve evidence and rights, rebuild from local known-good material, attest with independent physical checks, reconnect in stages, and recover after injected faults without remote support.

    High Consequence

    1. cybersecurity
    2. spacecraft-safety
    3. life-support-continuity
    4. governance
    5. dual-use

12. claim-source · src-cr-ccsds-350-0-g-3

    The Application of Security to CCSDS Protocols↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    44f5371a3c01028d94ba87eb2c3367b47b781a3fe2f7de8e0bb5c7486278d8fb

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-ccsds-350-0-g-3

    Title

    The Application of Security to CCSDS Protocols

    Authors

    1. Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems

    Publisher

    CCSDS

    Year

    2019

    URL

    https://public.ccsds.org/Pubs/350x0g3.pdf↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Ccsds informational green book (exact value: ccsds-informational-green-book)

    Checked At

    2026-07-26

    Version

    CCSDS 350.0-G-3, Issue 3

    Scope Note

    Consensus informational report on security concepts, mechanisms, implementation options, and effects on CCSDS services, primarily for space-ground and ground-space links. The report explicitly is not a CCSDS Recommended Standard and excludes detailed security-analysis and risk-assessment methods.

13. claim-source · src-cr-cisa-sbom

    Software Bill of Materials↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    d551139e9329c0f04e2480582f3dd9123e7d717b8bfedf5cb6141bc087053d16

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-cisa-sbom

    Title

    Software Bill of Materials

    Authors

    1. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

    Publisher

    CISA

    Year

    2026

    URL

    https://www.cisa.gov/sbom↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government software transparency resource (exact value: government-software-transparency-resource)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Official SBOM definition, ecosystem roles, use cases, community resources, and minimum-elements guidance; an SBOM is component evidence rather than proof of safety.

14. claim-source · src-cr-ietf-rfc9019-suit

    A Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    f89082ee842c244fde0169bd864fb0a0b2e4390d2b8bda120bbe1fcb414b62e7

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-ietf-rfc9019-suit

    Title

    A Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things

    Authors

    1. Brendan Moran
    2. Hannes Tschofenig
    3. David Brown
    4. Milton Meriac

    Publisher

    IETF

    Year

    2021

    URL

    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9019↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Ietf informational architecture (exact value: ietf-informational-architecture)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Informational IETF architecture for authenticated firmware manifests, stakeholder separation, target matching, sequence control, dependencies, interruption tolerance, and recovery.

15. claim-source · src-cr-nasa-cryptolib-2023

    The State of CryptoLib – The Open-Source Satellite Cryptography Library↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    841fcaee2944c6aef6a4e4b5275ddaaea99533977c6de713671c428d94b6998c

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nasa-cryptolib-2023

    Title

    The State of CryptoLib – The Open-Source Satellite Cryptography Library

    Authors

    1. D. Cody Cutright
    2. Scott A. Zemerick
    3. Robert J. Brown
    4. John P. Lucas
    5. Justin R. Morris

    Publisher

    NASA Technical Reports Server

    Year

    2023

    URL

    https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20230015937↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Nasa conference abstract (exact value: nasa-conference-abstract)

    Checked At

    2026-07-26

    Scope Note

    Professionally reviewed conference record distributed in 2023; NTRS marks the available record onlyAbstract=true. The abstract describes an actively developed open-source C library that aims to be CCSDS Space Data Link Security compliant and reports selected Telecommand, Telemetry, and Advanced Orbiting Systems encryption and decryption functions. It does not establish CCSDS conformance, secure implementation, operational deployment, flight qualification, key-management assurance, or long-duration maintenance.

16. claim-source · src-cr-nasa-space-security-bpg-revb

    Space Security: Best Practices Guide↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    49def0ff9598b6f4abebd7c72c8abe70acd2cba861d8cb9407389b95a0ef3d94

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nasa-space-security-bpg-revb

    Title

    Space Security: Best Practices Guide

    Authors

    1. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

    Publisher

    NASA

    Year

    2024

    URL

    https://swehb.nasa.gov/download/attachments/166592616/Space%20Security%20Best%20Practices%20Guide%20BPG%20REV%20B.pdf?api=v2↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Nasa space security guidance (exact value: nasa-space-security-guidance)

    Checked At

    2026-07-26

    Version

    Revision B

    Document Date

    2024-01-19

    Scope Note

    Public NASA guidance translating selected NIST SP 800-53 controls into space-vehicle and ground-segment mission language. It is a risk-based starting point and expressly does not replace required plans or establish a certified architecture, flight qualification, or long-duration assurance.

17. claim-source · src-cr-nasa-std-1006a

    Space System Protection Standard↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    21bc08c8476b722c9011a875a0feeef60390048860f419d797f96be3a5cf998a

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nasa-std-1006a

    Title

    Space System Protection Standard

    Authors

    1. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

    Publisher

    NASA Technical Standards System

    Year

    2022

    URL

    https://standards.nasa.gov/standard/NASA/NASA-STD-1006↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Active nasa mandatory standard (exact value: active-nasa-mandatory-standard)

    Checked At

    2026-07-26

    Version

    A

    Document Date

    2022-07-15

    Status

    ACTIVE

    Review Due

    2027-07-15

    Scope Note

    Active Agency-level protection requirements intended to make NASA missions resilient to threats. The standard is normative authority for its NASA scope, not demonstration that a particular system satisfies the requirements or that a generation-ship architecture is integrated or assured.

18. claim-source · src-cr-nist-controls-80053r5

    Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    efe4dc6860fbdda228dced85b87695df8d60684aeb6526e328be4724db7cc583

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-controls-80053r5

    Title

    Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations

    Authors

    1. Joint Task Force

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2020

    URL

    https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government security privacy control catalog (exact value: government-security-privacy-control-catalog)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Control families spanning access, audit, contingency, identity, incident response, privacy, supply chain, communications, and system integrity; a catalog to tailor, not a certified architecture.

19. claim-source · src-cr-nist-crypto-agility-cswp39u1

    Considerations for Achieving Crypto Agility: Strategies and Practices↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    e00c46443bd97a74130ad2e19af942cfe9a635c7eea66e135de4171632673b05

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-crypto-agility-cswp39u1

    Title

    Considerations for Achieving Crypto Agility: Strategies and Practices

    Authors

    1. Elaine Barker
    2. Lily Chen
    3. David Cooper
    4. Dustin Moody
    5. Andrew Regenscheid
    6. Murugiah Souppaya
    7. William Newhouse
    8. Russ Housley
    9. Sean Turner
    10. William Barker
    11. Karen Kent

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2026

    URL

    https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/cswp/39/upd1/considerations-for-achieving-crypto-agility/final↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government cryptographic transition guidance (exact value: government-cryptographic-transition-guidance)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Inventory, discovery, operational mechanisms, transition strategies, protocol and application considerations, trade-offs, and open work for cryptographic agility; updated through 2026-06-29.

20. claim-source · src-cr-nist-cyber-resilience-800160v2r1

    Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems: A Systems Security Engineering Approach↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    44c9cb7acf30fe7dae9002044900433af81212da661b965f9264af72a409aec1

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-cyber-resilience-800160v2r1

    Title

    Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems: A Systems Security Engineering Approach

    Authors

    1. National Institute of Standards and Technology

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2021

    URL

    https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-160v2r1↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government cyber resilience guidance (exact value: government-cyber-resilience-guidance)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Cyber-resiliency goals, objectives, techniques, approaches, design principles, and systems-engineering lifecycle; not a generation-ship architecture or certification.

21. claim-source · src-cr-nist-fips203-mlkem

    Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    a8bc98ef3f8daf79edc2206df6273a4f8e046a98b172df40a11061d4b936f78a

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-fips203-mlkem

    Title

    Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard

    Authors

    1. National Institute of Standards and Technology

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2024

    URL

    https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government cryptographic standard (exact value: government-cryptographic-standard)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    ML-KEM algorithms and parameter sets for establishing shared secrets; NIST lists potential updates and does not claim century-scale security or implementation assurance.

22. claim-source · src-cr-nist-fips204-mldsa

    Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    4b47fc94489002ab20d4e7858bcf1ddfce9f09ec939fa84ced8271cb124eba1e

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-fips204-mldsa

    Title

    Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard

    Authors

    1. National Institute of Standards and Technology

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2024

    URL

    https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government cryptographic standard (exact value: government-cryptographic-standard)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    ML-DSA digital-signature algorithms and parameter sets; standardization does not establish indefinite security, implementation correctness, or archival continuity.

23. claim-source · src-cr-nist-firmware-800193

    Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    08984a00ed4540ac34b3290412d4c5c6eddd595f4207fee8aa92a63c48b9017c

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-firmware-800193

    Title

    Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines

    Authors

    1. Andrew Regenscheid

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2018

    URL

    https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-193↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government platform resilience guidance (exact value: government-platform-resilience-guidance)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Roots of trust and mechanisms to protect, detect, and recover platform firmware and critical data after destructive attacks.

24. claim-source · src-cr-nist-incident-80061r3

    Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community Profile↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    5f3dd381a84f21187a92324d4aa5da91ce04e14d59aef5f5faaca6227359d59d

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-incident-80061r3

    Title

    Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community Profile

    Authors

    1. Alexander Nelson
    2. Sanjay Rekhi
    3. Murugiah Souppaya
    4. Karen Scarfone

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2025

    URL

    https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r3↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government incident response guidance (exact value: government-incident-response-guidance)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Incident preparation, detection, response, recovery, communications, analysis, mitigation, and improvement across CSF 2.0 functions.

25. claim-source · src-cr-nist-key-management-80057p1r5

    Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1 — General↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    8de5e1eb786969d11a6a1544085a1663f7c54cfb69eb79f4de3da9231844c3cf

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-key-management-80057p1r5

    Title

    Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1 — General

    Authors

    1. Elaine Barker

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2020

    URL

    https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government key management guidance (exact value: government-key-management-guidance)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Cryptographic services, key types, lifecycle functions, protection, compromise, backup, recovery, archival, and destruction.

26. claim-source · src-cr-nist-recovery-800184

    Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    d43cc61a580591a7ef3ddd073f2913df1e480bf7d7866279bca0d53880fd780c

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-recovery-800184

    Title

    Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery

    Authors

    1. Michael Bartock
    2. Jeffrey Cichonski
    3. Murugiah Souppaya
    4. Matthew Smith
    5. Greg Witte
    6. Karen Scarfone

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2016

    URL

    https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-184↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government cyber recovery guidance (exact value: government-cyber-recovery-guidance)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Recovery planning, playbooks, testing, metrics, restoration, and improvement for current organizations; assumes terrestrial institutional support.

27. claim-source · src-cr-nist-scrm-800161r1u1

    Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    02be470198b0c48432a90e4c5ac8374c588bad818fe7b37a7b663719ccab90bf

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-scrm-800161r1u1

    Title

    Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations

    Authors

    1. Jon Boyens
    2. Angela Smith
    3. Nadya Bartol
    4. Kris Winkler
    5. Alex Holbrook
    6. Matthew Fallon

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2024

    URL

    https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-161r1-upd1↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government supply chain risk guidance (exact value: government-supply-chain-risk-guidance)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Multilevel lifecycle guidance for identifying, assessing, and mitigating malicious functionality, counterfeit, tampering, and poor development or manufacturing practice.

28. claim-source · src-cr-nist-ssdf-800218

    Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    bda553d2c9f6bc9091b819eb153491cf8392cac73836f86a15eefee22fac1003

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-ssdf-800218

    Title

    Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1

    Authors

    1. Murugiah Souppaya
    2. Karen Scarfone
    3. Donna Dodson

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2022

    URL

    https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government secure development guidance (exact value: government-secure-development-guidance)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Outcome-based practices for preparing an organization, protecting software, producing well-secured releases, and responding to vulnerabilities.

29. claim-source · src-cr-nist-zero-trust-800207

    Zero Trust Architecture↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    4084c1d50c6edb3efc017ff0bfe23d5280297df0258c440ca27973d10702e901

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-cr-nist-zero-trust-800207

    Title

    Zero Trust Architecture

    Authors

    1. Scott Rose
    2. Oliver Borchert
    3. Stu Mitchell
    4. Sean Connelly

    Publisher

    NIST

    Year

    2020

    URL

    https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Government cybersecurity architecture guidance (exact value: government-cybersecurity-architecture-guidance)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Resource-focused zero-trust tenets, logical components, deployment models, and threats for enterprise systems; does not establish closed-habitat integration.

30. claim-source · src-im-nasa-eee-873910

    Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts Assurance Standard↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    7de974366c68ddd53ce47a7829040b0f7d644de2713f873827f7eacbe97c2287

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-im-nasa-eee-873910

    Title

    Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts Assurance Standard

    Authors

    1. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

    Publisher

    NASA

    Year

    2017

    URL

    https://standards.nasa.gov/standard/NASA/NASA-STD-873910↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Active electronic parts assurance standard (exact value: active-electronic-parts-assurance-standard)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Selection, acquisition, traceability, testing, handling, packaging, storage, application, and risk control for spaceflight electronic and electromechanical parts.

31. claim-source · src-im-nasa-metrology-873912

    Metrology and Calibration↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    8fa80c312101f162e43d1a51a136596e2cd0ff81f1b218ff7227df062b3e3540

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-im-nasa-metrology-873912

    Title

    Metrology and Calibration

    Authors

    1. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

    Publisher

    NASA

    Year

    2024

    URL

    https://standards.nasa.gov/standard/NASA/NASA-STD-873912↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Active metrology calibration standard (exact value: active-metrology-calibration-standard)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Selection, calibration, control, and use of measuring and test equipment whose results affect safety or mission success.

32. claim-source · src-im-nasa-std-6030

    Additive Manufacturing Requirements for Spaceflight Systems↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    7e6a5d45f27e760d46772f9f030ecd9397047f8274aa4525946c18e6d6b34d90

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-im-nasa-std-6030

    Title

    Additive Manufacturing Requirements for Spaceflight Systems

    Authors

    1. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

    Publisher

    NASA

    Year

    2021

    URL

    https://standards.nasa.gov/standard/NASA/NASA-STD-6030↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Active spaceflight manufacturing standard (exact value: active-spaceflight-manufacturing-standard)

    Checked At

    2026-07-26

    Version

    Baseline

    Change Number

    0

    Document Date

    2021-04-21

    Status

    ACTIVE

    Review Due

    2026-04-21

    Freshness Note

    NASA still marks the baseline ACTIVE even though the listed five-year review date has passed; GShips therefore treats it as current-with-review-due rather than obsolete.

    Scope Note

    Requirements for part classification, feedstock and process control, machine qualification, witness material, inspection, acceptance, configuration, and tailored in-space additive manufacturing. This is normative authority for NASA spaceflight hardware, not a demonstration of printed-part performance, autonomous repair, circular manufacturing, or cyber recovery.

33. claim-source · src-pn-ietf-bpsec

    RFC 9172: Bundle Protocol Security↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    266d01cc374ffb39ae67ac92d5819b03617401cdf12935e25b0dea13f4a3a1d4

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-pn-ietf-bpsec

    Title

    RFC 9172: Bundle Protocol Security

    Authors

    1. Edward Birrane
    2. Kurt McKeever

    Publisher

    Internet Engineering Task Force

    Year

    2022

    URL

    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9172.html↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Internet standard (exact value: internet-standard)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Bundle integrity and confidentiality blocks, security processing, threat assumptions, key-management exclusions, and interoperability requirements.

34. claim-source · src-pn-jpl-dsac

    Working Overtime: NASA's Deep Space Atomic Clock Completes Mission↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Record fingerprint

    eb44d6f5e829543be29e410f9cc10f9588df681ae8fe28478bfb705f4c47c199

    Minimum approvals

    1

    Required scope groups

    bounded-competence: information-science

    High-consequence domains

    None under the named two-person rule

    Review state

    pending

    Published human decisions

    0

    Inspect the complete frozen review surface

    ID

    src-pn-jpl-dsac

    Title

    Working Overtime: NASA's Deep Space Atomic Clock Completes Mission

    Authors

    1. Jet Propulsion Laboratory

    Publisher

    NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory

    Year

    2021

    URL

    https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/working-overtime-nasas-deep-space-atomic-clock-completes-mission/↗ (opens external site in a new tab)

    Kind

    Technology demonstration record (exact value: technology-demonstration-record)

    Checked At

    2026-07-25

    Scope Note

    Deep Space Atomic Clock mission duration, spaceflight technology-demonstration boundary, and reported timing stability over more than twenty days.

Frozen source snapshots

Source inclusion does not determine the disposition. Reviewers must inspect the cited locator and relation, note inaccessible material, and identify stronger or conflicting evidence.

Offline packet and worksheet

Downloads contain no reviewer contact details. Downloading does not create an account or store a review response in the GShips application. Ordinary provider request or analytics logs may record the download request. Work locally: the public site has no review account, upload endpoint, or decision-submission API.

Do not paste a completed decision, identity documents, private contact data, confidential conflict evidence, medical information, controlled material, or exploit details into a public form. Until a separately authorized private handoff exists, retain the completed worksheet locally.

Packet schema · JSON · Decision-bundle schema · JSON

Validate offline

Use Node.js 22.13.0 or later. Keep the packet, worksheet, completed decision, and all six kit files together in a local directory.

1. Download the six kit files below. Complete a copy of the JSON template offline and preserve its templateFingerprint.
2. Finalize a separate output file.

   node finalize-review-decision.mjs \
     --input DRAFT.json \
     --output COMPLETED.json

   This marks the copy complete and calculates an unkeyed canonical bundle fingerprint. A fingerprint detects changes; it is not a reviewer signature.

3. Validate the packet and completed copy.

   node check-review-decisions.mjs \
     --packet PACKET.json \
     --decision COMPLETED.json

   Add another --decision for each independent reviewer.

4. Interpret the result narrowly. A zero exit proves structural consistency only. Neither command appoints or qualifies a reviewer, establishes independence, accepts a decision, or authorizes publication.

• Bundle finalizer
• Validator command
• Decision policy module
• Fingerprint and packet-integrity module
• Review-domain policy module
• Canonical synthesis and interactive review specs